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Do superstitious traders lose money? We answer this question in the context of trading in the Taiwan 
Futures Exchange, where we exploit the Chinese superstition that the number “8” is lucky and the number 
“4” is unlucky. We find that individual investors, but not institutional investors, submit disproportionately 
more limit orders at “8” than at “4.” This imbalance, defined as “superstition index” for each investor, is 
positively correlated with trading losses. Superstitious investors lose money mainly because of their bad 
market timing and stale orders. Nevertheless, the reliance on number superstition for limit order 
submissions does decrease with trading experience. 
  
Keywords: superstition, limit order clustering, investment performance, individual investors 
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Superstition, which is defined as a belief that is not based on reason, has been a part of the human 
condition since humans began.
1
 Michael Jordan, arguably the greatest basketball player of all time, wore 
his University of North Carolina shorts under his uniform every time he led the Chicago Bulls to their six 
NBA championships.
2
 The European governing body of Formula 1 auto racing, which is based in Paris 
and Geneva, bans the number “13” in its entry list for cars.3 India’s Independence Day falls a day after 
Pakistan’s because astrologers in India insisted that August 14, 1947, was an inauspicious day to become 
independent.
4
 The Games of the XXIX Summer Olympics opened in Beijing on August 8, 2008, at 8:08 
p.m. because the number “8” is a lucky number in Chinese culture. In contrast, Chinese culture considers 
the number “4” to be unlucky. For instance, some buildings in China have no fourth floor (Kramer and 
Block, 2008), and there is an unwritten rule in the Taiwan Navy that the digits of a naval vessel’s number 
should not add up to four (Tsang, 2004). 
It is surprising, considering how pervasive superstition is globally, that there is no academic 
research, as far as we know, on the effect of superstition on individual trading decisions and investment 
performance. This paper is one such piece of research that aims to add to the emerging literature on the 
behavior of retail investors. Specifically, we investigate whether some investors carry their superstitious 
beliefs in numbers over to their trading, how this type of superstitious trading behavior affects their 
investment performance, and, lastly, whether learning by trading helps investors alleviate their reliance on 
their number superstition.  
We answer these questions by examining limit order submissions in the Taiwan Futures 
Exchange (TAIFEX). In Mandarin, the official language of Taiwan, the pronunciation of the number “4” 
sounds like “death” and is regarded as inauspicious. On the contrary, the number “8” is considered 
auspicious as its pronunciation sounds like “good fortune.” If Mandarin-speaking investors prefer the 
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number “8” over the number “4,” we might observe disproportionately more limit orders submitted at 
prices ending with the number “8” and disproportionately fewer limit orders submitted at prices ending 
with the number “4.”5  
Taking advantage of the account-level trades and quotes records of index futures in TAIFEX, we 
show that individual investors are indeed affected by this number superstition when submitting limit 
orders. The submission ratio at “8,” calculated as the limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” over 
all submitted limit orders, is 0.098.
6
 This ratio is significantly higher than 0.063, the submission ratio at 
prices ending with “4.” In contrast, the difference between the submission ratios at these two numbers is 
not significant for domestic institutional investors nor for Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFIIs). In particular, for domestic institutional investors, the submission ratio at “8” is 0.103, while the 
submission ratio at “4” is 0.100. The submission ratios at “8” and “4” for QFIIs are 0.097 and 0.094, 
respectively. These results indicate that individual investors use heuristics based on number superstition 
when making investment decisions, whereas institutional investors, domestic or foreign, do not. 
Next, we investigate the association between investors’ number superstition and their investment 
performance. To empirically test this association, we calculate the limit order submission ratios at prices 
ending at 0, 1, 2, …9 as the number of limit orders submitted at that price point scaled by the total 
number of limit orders submitted at all price points. We then construct a superstition index for each 
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 We focus on the last digit because the effect of superstitious beliefs is more likely to be present in this 
digit. In most trading days within our sample period, only the last two digits of the four-digit Taiwan 
futures index move, the last digit (right-most digit) moving the most. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that investors mostly concentrate on the last digit when making their trading decisions. In this sense, our 
paper is distinct from the price barrier literature, such as Ley and Varian (1994), who show that prices 
behave differently when they approach round numbers like 100 and 1000. They focus on the left-most 
digit while we focus on the right-most digit. Meanwhile, unlike the left-most digit, there is no evidence 
that the right-most digit of prices follows Benford’s Law (Benford, 1938, and Ley, 1996). In our case, if 
investors are not superstitious, we would observe a uniform distribution of the last digit of limit order 
prices. 
6
 We find that the limit orders submission ratios at prices ending with “0” and “5” of individual investors 
are 0.249 and 0.148, respectively. This is consistent with the notion that individual investors’ limit order 
tend to cluster at round numbers (Kuo, Lin, and Zhao, 2015). 
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investor by calculating the difference between his limit order submission ratios at prices ending at “8” and 
at “4.” 7 The higher the superstition index, the more superstitious an investor is. 
After sorting individual investors into five groups according to their superstition indices in the 
current year, we find that individual investors with a higher degree of number superstition have 
significantly lower intraday, 1-day, and 5-day mark-to-market index returns of their executed limit orders 
in the subsequent year. The individuals within the top-quintile of the superstition index underperform 
their counterparts within the bottom-quintile of the superstition index by 1.7 basis points within a trading 
day. The underperformance deteriorates to 2.4 (6.3) basis points one (five) day(s) after the limit order 
executions. In addition, we also find underperformance of superstitious individual investors for their 
market orders and round-trip trades. Specifically, the underperformance of intraday market orders is 1.3 
basis points, which is similar in magnitude as the underperformance of the intraday limit order returns.  
The negative association between superstition index and subsequent investment performance 
remains significant after controlling for several factors that are known to be related to investment 
performance. These factors include the wealth (proxied by the average order size), cognitive limitation 
(proxied by the round-number limit order submission ratio used in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao, 2015), experience 
(proxied by the number of limit orders submitted in the previous year), the disposition effect, and the past 
performance. We also find similar results based on a two-stage regression. In particular, we first regress 
the superstition index on the concurrent control variables to extract the residual superstition index. We 
then regress the investment performance on the residual superstition index which, by construction, is 
orthogonal to the control variables. Both findings indicate that the number superstition captures a distinct 
aspect of investors’ trading skill that is negatively related to their investment performance. 
 We then perform two sets of placebo tests to check the robustness of the negative link between 
superstition and trading performance. First, since we find that limit order submissions of institutional 
investors are not affected by lucky/unlucky numbers, we should not find the superstition index to be 
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 The superstition index is calculated using all submitted limit orders, while the investment performance is 
calculated only using the executed ones. 
4 
 
associated with investment performance for these investors. Our results are in line with this intuition. 
Second, we construct a pseudo superstition index using the difference between submission ratios at “7” 
and “3.” The numbers “7” and “3” are viewed as neither lucky nor unlucky in Chinese culture. We find 
that the pseudo superstition index is not correlated with investment performance, which lends further 
support to our main findings.
8
 
We next explore why superstitious investors lose money. We find that superstitious individual 
investors have bad market timing as they buy less (more), compared with their non-superstitious 
counterparts, on trading days with high (low) market returns. This could be partly driven by the fact that 
their limit orders become stale in the absence of active monitoring after submission, and other traders take 
advantage of this by hitting their limit orders with a buy (sell) order immediately after good (bad) news. 
Our results indicate that the limit orders submitted by superstitious individual investors do have longer 
time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation for both buy and sell orders. We go on to show that 
institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, make money from the most superstitious traders.  
 Finally, we examine whether investor learning could mitigate the reliance on the number 
superstition for submitting limit orders. Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) find that some individual 
investors may become better at trading with experience. In our context, investors might become less 
affected by the superstitious number heuristics when they learn from past trading experience. To test this 
learning-by-trading hypothesis, we regress the difference of superstition index between two consecutive 
years on the number of limit orders submitted in the previous year. We use the difference in superstition 
index to control for the unobserved invariant investor characteristics. Our result shows that past trading 
frequency helps to reduce individual investors’ propensity to submit superstitious limit orders. A one-
standard-deviation (51 limit orders) increase in the number of limit orders submitted in the previous year 
                                                          
8
 We also consider two more pseudo superstition indices, the differences between submission ratios at “7” 
and “2” and those at “2” and “3.” We do not find a significant association between these two pseudo 
superstition indices and investment performance either. These results are not tabulated but, like all other 
successive untabulated results, are available from the authors on request. 
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leads to a 0.74% more reduction of the superstition index in the current year. We further find that, though 
trading experience reduces superstition, this learning effect diminishes over time. 
Alternatively, investors could learn in a naïve and reinforced way from their past performance. 
Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011) show that high returns in previous IPO auctions increase 
the likelihood of participating in future auctions, and both bidders’ returns and their auction selection 
abilities deteriorate afterwards. However, we do not find supportive evidence for this reinforcement 
learning, as individual investors do not submit more limit orders at “8” when they observe higher returns 
of orders submitted at these lucky prices.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on retail investor behavior, the field that deals with the 
psychological biases that affect individual trading decisions (biases like overconfidence or disposition 
effect) and the consequences of these biases on investment performance.
9
 Specifically, we explore one 
particular type of heuristics that some investors have when making trading decisions: reference points 
based on number superstition. Since the seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), there have been 
many studies exploring how people rely on reference points when making choices under uncertainty. For 
example, 52-week high stock prices have been shown to influence financial decisions among various 
market participants.
10
 A number of studies find that round number prices serve as reference points in 
financial decision making as well.
11
 Although there are few studies on lucky and unlucky numbers as 
reference points, we provide the first attempt to show that some retail investors use lucky and unlucky 
                                                          
9
 Barber and Odean (2013) provide an excellent survey of this field. 
10
 The following have been influenced: corporate managers (Baker, Pan, and Wurgler, 2012), employees 
(Heath, Huddart, and Lang, 1999), options traders (Poteshman and Serbin, 2003; Driessen, Lin, and Van 
Hemert, 2013), stock traders (George and Hwang, 2004; Li and Yu, 2012), and analysts (Birru, 2015; Li, 
Lin, and Lin, 2015). 
11
 See, for example, Neiderhoffer (1965, 1966); Ball, Torous, and Tschoegl (1985); Harris (1991); Curcio 
and Goodhart (1991); Donaldson and Kim (1993); Christie and Schultz (1994); Christie, Harris, and 
Schultz (1994); Ley and Varian (1994); Gwilym, Clare, and Thomas (1998a, 1998b); Booth, Kallunki, 
Lin, and Martikainen (2000); Palmon, Smith, and Sopranzetti (2004); Sonnemans (2005); and 
Bhattacharya, Holden and Jacobsen (2012). 
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The fact that superstitious individuals exist in the world may be obvious. However, it is not clear 
that they carry their superstition to trade important assets like a stock index futures. Further, as heuristics 
are often efficient thumb rules that govern decisions under uncertainty, it is not clear that all heuristics 
used in financial decision-making lead to losses. Superstitious investors may not lose money if their 
superstitious beliefs in numbers, though interesting in its own right, is irrelevant to their trading prowess. 
Thus, finding out why they lose money – bad market timing and stale orders – sheds more light on our 
understanding of the retail investor behavior.  
Lastly, our paper also adds to the household finance literature, a literature Campbell (2006) 
succinctly motivates in his AFA presidential address: “The welfare benefits of financial markets depend 
in large part on how effectively households use these markets.” Our results indicate that some retail 
investors use financial markets unwisely, and so there may be room for financial education to improve 
their welfare as we show that learning mitigates the reliance of retail investors on number superstition.  
 
I. Hypotheses Development from the Literature 
A. Limit Orders Submitted at Prices Ending with Lucky and Unlucky Numbers  
The psychology literature documents that superstitious beliefs affect individuals’ optimism (e.g., 
Darke and Freedman, 1997). Superstitious beliefs also affect the willingness to take financial risks.
13
 
Recent studies on real estate prices show that housing prices are inflated when the floor number or the 
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 For example, Kolb and Rodriguez (1987) find that during the period from 1962 to 1985, the mean 
CRSP index return for Friday the Thirteenth is significantly lower than that for other Fridays. However, 
Dyl and Maberly (1988) do not find the same result according to S&P index return data from 1940 to 
1987.  
13
 Using cognitive priming experiments, Jiang, Cho, and Adaval (2009) find that Asian individuals, who 
are exposed to lucky numbers, give higher estimates of their chances of winning a lottery, are more 
willing to participate in a lottery or a risky promotional game, and express greater willingness to make 
risky financial investments. 
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number in the address is a lucky one.
14 
In financial markets, there is limited evidence that numerical 
superstitious beliefs matter.
15
 Hirshleifer, Jian, and Zhang (2016) find that newly listed Chinese firms are 
more likely to have lucky numbers in their listing codes. The firms with lucky listing codes are traded at a 
premium and experience inferior post-IPO abnormal returns. Brown, Chua, and Mitchell (2002) and 
Brown and Mitchell (2008) show that the daily opening and closing prices cluster at the number “8” in 
Asian Pacific and Chinese stock markets. 
IPO listing codes and transaction prices do not directly reflect the number preference of 
individual investors, as investors do not directly control listing codes or transaction prices. In contrast, 
individual investors directly choose the prices for their limit orders. The question is which digit of the 
four-digit TAIFEX index investors are most likely to focus on when they submit their limit orders. 
Although the price of index futures in TAIFEX ranges from 4,011 to 9,934 during our sample period, the 
average daily standard deviation and daily price range are only around 26 and 87 index points, 
respectively. On most trading days within our sample period, only the last two digits of the four-digit 
index fluctuate. Furthermore, since a tick size is one index point, and an investor can only observe the 
five best asks and bids in the limit order book, the effect of superstitious beliefs is most likely to appear in 
the last digit of the four-digit index.
16
 
If investors are not affected by their superstitious beliefs, the last digit of limit order prices should 
be uniformly distributed. If, on the contrary, individual investors take lucky/unlucky numbers into 
account when submitting limit orders, it would lead to a disproportionately large (small) volume of limit 
orders submitted at prices ending with lucky (unlucky) numbers. This gives us our first hypothesis: 
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 See, for example, Agarwal, He, Liu, Png, Sing, and Wong (2014); Shum, Sun, and Ye (2014); and 
Fortin, Hill, and Huang (2014). 
15
 Dichev and Janes (2003), Yuan, Zheng, and Zhu (2006), and Lepori (2009) show that the occurrence of 
negative superstitious events (i.e. eclipses) is associated with lower trading volumes and lower stock 
returns. 
16
 Take the limit order book at 13:45 on September 12, 2014, for example. The best five bid prices are 
9244, 9243, 9242, 9241, and 9240, while the best five ask prices are 9245, 9246, 9247, 9248, and 9249, 
respectively. The only difference among these best five bids and five asks is in the last digit. 
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Hypothesis 1: Individual investors submit a disproportionately large volume of limit orders at 
prices ending with “8” and submit a disproportionately small volume of limit orders at prices ending at 
“4.” Moreover, institutional investors, particularly QFII, are not subject to this number superstition. 
Domestic institutional investors may not be affected by number superstition if their order 
submissions hinge on their professional analyses. For the foreign institutional investors, as the number 
superstition originates from the Mandarin language, this type of superstition should be even more 
irrelevant to their financial decision making.
17
 We thus expect limit order submissions to be uniformly 
distributed in the last digit for institutional investors. 
 
B. Superstition and Investment Performance 
There exist two intimately related causes why the superstition index might be negatively related 
to the subsequent investment performance of an individual investor. First, superstition might reflect an 
investor’s overall trading skills, and this leads to a negative correlation between superstition index and 
investment performance. This inferior trading skill could be due to lower abilities in information 
gathering and information processing. As the trading skill has been linked to other investor characteristics 
like wealth, experience, cognitive ability, and other behavioral biases like the disposition effect, it is 
important to show that the negative relation between our superstition index and investment performance 
remains significant even after controlling for these investor characteristics.  
For example, Geng, Li, Subrahmanyam, and Yu (2014) find that the wealthy investors in China 
beat the performance of the market portfolio by a large margin. Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) 
show evidence that trading experience helps to improve investment decisions. Cognitive ability, proxied 
by an investor’s IQ, is found to be associated with his wealth level, stock market participation, investment 
performance, and mutual fund choice (Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa, 2011, 2012; and Grinblatt, 
Ikäheimo, Keloharju, and Knüpfer, 2016). Similarly, Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015) employ the proportion of 
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Institutional investors from China, who may be subject to the same numerical superstition, did not trade 
in the Taiwanese financial markets during our sample period. 
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limit orders submitted at round number prices as a proxy for cognitive limitation and show a negative 
correlation between cognitive limitation and investment performance. Further, Odean (1998) finds that 
investors who are reluctant to realize their losses – the disposition effect – have lower subsequent returns. 
In our multivariate regressions, we incorporate these known characteristics as control variables. Our result 
is robust to controlling for this set of proxies for poor trading skills. 
Second, even when an investor has average trading skills, his number preference originating from 
superstition might result in a suboptimal submission strategy of limit orders, which also leads to a 
negative relation between our superstition index and limit order performance. For example, when it is 
optimal to submit a limit order ending at “7” or “9,” a superstitious investor might choose to submit at 
“8,” which results in a lower performance at “8.” For another example, when it is optimal to submit at 
“4,” a superstitious investor might submit at “3,” “5,” or any other number, which also leads to the 
underperformance for limit orders whose prices end with numbers other than “4.” 
We thus propose our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: An investor’s superstition level is negatively associated with his subsequent 
investment performance. 
To test our second hypothesis, we calculate a superstition index for each investor in the following 
way. We first calculate the limit order submission ratios at prices ending at 0, 1, 2, …9 as the number of 
limit orders submitted at that price point scaled by the total number of limit orders submitted at all price 
points. A superstition index is then constructed for each investor by calculating the difference between his 
limit order submission ratios at prices ending at “8” and at “4.” The higher the index, the higher the 
number superstition of an investor. In the empirical section, we do find that superstitious investors 
underperform and exhibit some suboptimal limit order submission strategies like bad market timing or 
stale limit orders. They also lose money at all price points to institutional investors.  
 
C. Investor Learning  
10 
 
The investor learning literature has shown that past trading experience has an impact on 
investment decisions. One line of literature focuses on learning by trading. Feng and Seasholes (2005) 
and Dhar and Zhu (2006) both find that investors’ trading experience, measured as trading frequency, 
mitigates the reluctance to realize losses. Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman (2010) show that some individual 
investors become better at trading when they become more experienced, while others stop trading after 
realizing that they have poor trading skills. Their findings show a positive influence of investor learning 
on future investment performance.  
Another line of investor learning literature argues that investors could learn in a naïve and 
overoptimistic way. For example, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) find that individual 
investors over-extrapolate from their personal experience when making savings decisions in their 401(K) 
accounts. Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman (2011) document that when a bidder had high returns in 
previous IPO auctions, he is more likely to participate in future auctions. Nevertheless, the returns and the 
auction selection ability deteriorate with his previous IPO auction returns. Their findings show that 
reinforcement learning based on past investment performance could negatively affect future performance.  
It is important to note that the two lines of literature use different measures for learning; the 
former uses past trading experience (frequency) and the latter uses past returns. In our context, if investors 
learn from trading experience, we should observe that they become less superstitious when more trading 
experience is accumulated. If investors learn in a naïve way, they may submit more orders at “8” when 
their limit order returns at “8” are high, and less orders at “4” when limit order returns at “4” are low. We 
thus propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3.A (Learning by Trading): The change in an investor’s superstition index between 
two years is negatively associated with the investor’s trading frequency in the previous year. 
Hypothesis 3.B (Reinforcement Learning): The change in an investor’s superstition index 
between two years is positively (negatively) associated with investor’s performance of limit orders 




II. Data Description 
A. The Taiwan Futures Exchange 
TAIFEX employs an Electronic Trading System (ETS) to process orders submitted by market 
participants from 8:45 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. The two major types of product traded in TAIFEX include the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures (hereafter TXF) and the Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Index 
Futures (hereafter MXF). The TXF is based on all listed stocks on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the 
MXF is a mini version of the TXF with a quarter of the margin and payoff for the TXF. The tick size of 
both contracts is one index point. One index point increase in the transaction price yields a profit of 200 
(50) New Taiwanese Dollar (TWD) for one TXF (MXF) contract.
18
 Both types of index futures have five 
maturity months: the spot month, the next calendar month, and the next three quarterly months. Each type 
of index futures with a certain maturity month is traded as one unique product in TAIFEX.
19  
 
B. Submitted and Executed Limit Orders  
We use all the limit order submission and execution records in TAIFEX during the period from 
January 2003 to September 2008. The data contain detailed information about investor account identity 
and investor type (individual investors, domestic proprietary investors, or Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investors (QFIIs)). We are thus able to examine the superstitious behavior of different investor types. 
Panel A of Table I shows that there are about 108 million limit orders submitted by market 
participants during the sample period. Among these orders, 61.87% are from individual investors, 34.17% 
from domestic proprietary investors, and 3.96% from QFIIs. Panel B of Table I shows that there are about 
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 One US Dollar is around 30 TWD during our sample period. 
19
 More institutional details for TAIFEX can be found in Liu, Tsai, Wang, and Zhu (2010), Li, Lin, Cheng, 
and Lai (2013), Kuo and Lin (2013), and Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015). 
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143 million limit order contracts transacted during our sample period.
20
 Individual investors account for 
73.20% of the transaction volume, while domestic institutional investors and QFIIs together account for 
the rest. Notice that one very important feature in TAIFEX is that individual investors, instead of 
institutional investors, are the major market participants. This market, therefore, provides us with an ideal 
environment to study the number superstition in trading among individual investors. Its second advantage 
is that index futures, unlike stocks, is a single product with a single large and liquid market, and so we do 
not have to control for various cross-sectional firm-specific stock characteristics. 
 (INSERT TABLE I HERE) 
When investigating the link between number superstition and investment performance, we require 
that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years to generate a meaningful 
estimate of the superstition index.
21
 After applying this screen, we obtained 125 million trades and 
156,171 investor-year observations. 
 
III. Limit Orders at Prices Ending with Lucky and Unlucky Numbers 
A. Limit Order Submissions among Different Investor Types 
To identify number superstition, we focus on the last digit of limit order prices. For example, if 
the limit order price is 6,508, we characterize the order as submitted at a price ending with the lucky 
number “8.” Similarly, the limit order with a price of 6,504 is treated as an order submitted at a price 
ending with the unlucky number “4.” The same logic is applied to other numbers in the last digit. We then 
calculate the limit order submission ratios at prices ending with a number “X” for the individual investors, 
domestic institutional investors, and QFIIs as follows: 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑋 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 "𝑋" 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 
                                       (1) 
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 Individual investors typically trade one or two contracts in one order, while institutional investors 
typically trade more contracts in one order. The overall execution ratio for submitted contracts is around 
0.444. 
21
 The same data filter is adopted in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015).  
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The submission ratio measures the proportion of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” 
(X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Theoretically, if investors trade index futures based on information 
or hedging needs, their limit orders should be equally likely to be submitted at prices ending with any 
integer ranging from 0 to 9. So this ratio should be 0.1 for each of the 10 Xs. However, if investors are 
affected by the superstition heuristic, they would submit disproportionately more limit orders at prices 
ending with “8” (the lucky prices) and fewer limit orders at prices ending with “4” (the unlucky prices).22  
Figure 1 shows the limit order submission ratio for each of the 10 last digits separately for 
individual investors, domestic institutions, and QFIIs. Figure 1.A shows that individual investors indeed 
submit more limit orders at “8” than those at “4.” The submission ratio is 0.098 at “8,” which is much 
higher than the 0.063 at “4.” The statistical significance of the difference in these two submission ratios 
will be presented in the regression analysis in the next sub-section. Figure 1.A also shows that individual 
investors tend to submit more limit orders at round numbers “0” and “5.” This is consistent with the limit 
order clustering at round number prices documented in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015). Figure 1.B shows a 
fairly uniform distribution of submission ratio for domestic institutions. In particular, the submission ratio 
at “8” is 0.103, while the submission ratio at “4” is 0.100. A similarly flat pattern for QFIIs is observed in 
Figure 1.C, where the submission ratios at “8” and “4” are 0.097 and 0.094, respectively. 
 
B. Multivariate Regression Analyses 
In this sub-section, we test the statistical significance of the number superstition through 
multivariate regression analyses. For each limit order, we are able to determine if it is submitted by an 
                                                          
22
 In addition to the superstition for price, we also consider the superstition for date. We examine the 
proportion of limit orders submitted on each date of the month. The logic is that if investors prefer the 
number 8 over 4, they might submit more limit orders on the 8
th
 of the month relative to the 4
th
 of the 
month. However, we do not find supportive evidence for date superstition. Figure A1.A in the Appendix 
shows that the submission ratio on the 8
th
 of the month is not significantly higher than that on the 4
th
 of 
the month for individual investors. The same is true for domestic institutions (Figure A1.B in the 
Appendix) and QFII (Figure A1.C in the Appendix). 
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individual investor, a domestic institution, or a QFII, and if it is to trade the MXF or the TXF. We run the 
following regression: 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑋 − 0.1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷8 + 𝛽2𝐷4 + 𝛽3𝐷0 + 𝛽4𝐷5 + (𝛽5𝐷8 + 𝛽6𝐷4 + 𝛽7𝐷0 + 𝛽8𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣
+ (𝛽9𝐷8 + 𝛽10𝐷4 + 𝛽11𝐷0 + 𝛽12𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 + (𝛽13𝐷8 + 𝛽14𝐷4 + 𝛽15𝐷0 + 𝛽16𝐷5)
× 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + (𝛽17𝐷8 + 𝛽18𝐷4 + 𝛽19𝐷0 + 𝛽20𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹
+ (𝛽21𝐷8 + 𝛽22𝐷4    + 𝛽23𝐷0 + 𝛽24𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + 𝛽25𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 + 𝛽26𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼
+ 𝛽27𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + 𝜀𝑋                                                     (2) 
The dependent variable is the deviation of the actual submission ratio at prices ending with “X” 
from its theoretical value, 0.1, under the assumption that the last digit of the prices of submitted limit 
orders follows a uniform distribution. In each year, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑋  is calculated separately for individual 
investors, domestic institutions, and QFIIs, and for MXF and TXF orders. 𝐷8, 𝐷4, 𝐷0, and 𝐷5 are dummy 
variables for X=8, 4, 0, and 5, respectively. Controlling for the round numbers, 0 and 5, facilitates 
removing the round-number effect. 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣  and 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼  are indicators for individual and QFII investors, 
respectively. 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 equals 1 if the order is to trade MXF, and 0 otherwise. 
𝛽1, 𝛽5, and 𝛽9 measure the extent to which submission ratio is abnormal at prices ending at “8” 
for domestic institutions, individual investors, and QFIIs, respectively. Here “abnormal” means that it is 
different from the mean submission ratio at the six other price points, “1”, “2”, “3”, “6”, “7” and “9”. 
Similarly, 𝛽2, 𝛽6, and 𝛽10 measure whether or not the submission ratio is abnormal at prices ending at “4” 
among these three groups, respectively. 
Model 2 of Table II provides supportive evidence that individual investors tend to submit more 
limit orders at “8” than at “4”. The proportion of limit orders submitted at “8” is 0.020 higher than the 
proportion of limit orders submitted at prices ending with a number other than “4,” “0,” and “5.” The 
submission ratios at “4” is 0.013 lower than the proportion of limit orders submitted at prices ending with 





 For institutional investors, the submission ratios are not significantly higher or lower at “8” 
and “4.” Model 5 of Table II shows that when we incorporate the triple-interaction terms, the insignificant 
coefficient 𝛽17 (-0.001) suggests that individual investors do not have a preference for the lucky prices 
ending at “8” beliefs when submitting both MXF and TXF orders. In contrast, the significantly negative 
coefficient 𝛽18 (-0.012) suggests that individual investors seem affected by their superstitious beliefs to 
avoid the unlucky prices ending at “4” when submitting both MXF than TXF orders. 
 (INSERT TABLE II HERE) 
C. Submissions of Buy and Sell Orders 
To take a closer look at the limit order submissions at the lucky and unlucky numbers, we report 
the submission ratios at the last one digit separately for buy and sell orders. This allows us to investigate 
if the number superstition varies among buy and sell limit orders. Figures A2 and A3 in the Appendix 
show that individual investors indeed submit more orders at “8” than at “4” both when they buy and when 
they sell. Similar to the previous results, such pattern is not evident for institutional investors. 
In summary, individual investors exhibit a significant and economically meaningful superstition 
heuristic in lucky and unlucky numbers when submitting limit orders. This result is robust to the type of 
limit order, namely, buy orders versus sell orders. On the other hand, institutional investors, domestic or 
foreign, do not exhibit statistically discernible patterns in number superstition. Overall, these results are 
supportive of Hypothesis 1. 
 
IV. Superstition and Investment Performance 
In this section, we construct an investor-level superstition index to measure the extent to which an 
investor’s number superstition is revealed by his limit order submission. We then examine the association 
between the superstition index and investment performance. 
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 We also perform an F-test to show that the difference between (𝛽1 + 𝛽5 ) and ( 𝛽2 + 𝛽6 ) is significant. 




A. The Superstition Index 
In each year t, we calculate the superstition index for each investor i as the following: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 "8"−𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑡 "4"
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖
           (3)  
 
To ensure a meaningful calculation of the superstition index, we require that an investor submit at 
least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years.
24
 Table AI in the Appendix presents the descriptive 
statistics of the superstition index. Panel A of Table AI shows that individual investors exhibit the highest 
degree of number superstition, with the mean and median being significantly higher than zero. Besides, 
the mean and median of superstition index appear to be persistent as well. In particular, the mean 
superstition index of individual investors slightly increases from 0.0365 in 2003 to 0.0493 in 2008. 
Moreover, the variation is large among these investors, with a high standard deviation around 0.091 in 
2008. Panel B of Table A1 shows that domestic institutional investors seem to exhibit some degree of 
numerical superstition in general, while Panel C of Table A1 shows that QFIIs do not show much favor 
(disfavor) in submitting limit orders at prices ending with “8” (“4”). 
 
B. Superstition Index and Other Individual Investor Traits 
We now report correlations between the superstition index and other individual investor traits 
documented in the literature. Table III shows that the superstition index persists over time. The 
correlation between the past year’s superstition index and the current year’s superstition index of an 
investor is 0.4205. This implies that number superstition is likely to be an investor’s innate trait.  
Table III also shows that the superstition index is negatively related to the average order size, 
which is our measure for investor’s wealth level. The Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) adopts a pre-
                                                          
24
 We also tried to winsorize the superstition index at 1% level on both sides to check if our findings are 
driven by outliers. We find quite similar results before and after winsorization. Thus, in the main text, we 
simply report the results without any winsorization. 
17 
 
margin system where an investor is required to deposit an initial margin in his margin account before he 
can actually trade. The more contracts an investor purchases or sells, the more the margin he needs to 
deposit. Thus, we employ the average number of contracts per order, i.e. the order size, as a proxy for 
investor’s wealth.25 Our result indicates that wealthy investors tend to be less superstitious. 
The correlation between superstition index and the limit order submission ratio at “0” and “5” is 
slightly negative, indicating that superstition index captures an investor’s trading characteristic that is 
different from his preference for round numbers. Further, investors who exhibit more significant 
disposition effect tend to be more affected by their superstitious beliefs in numbers.  
Collectively, the correlations in Table III show that superstition is related to other characteristics 
of investors that affect investment performance. The correlations, however, are not high in magnitude, 
implying that even though superstition is correlated with these investor characteristics, it is distinct from 
them. Thus, it is important to control for these investor traits when we perform the analysis on the relation 
between superstition and investment performance. 
(INSERT TABLE III HERE) 
 
C. Superstition Index and Investment Performance of Individual Investors—Quintile Analysis 
We sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year and look at their 
investment performance in the subsequent year. For the remainder of this paper, investors with higher 
(lower) superstition index are referred to as Q5 (Q1) investors. The performance metrics we use to 
                                                          
25
 For detailed margin requirement, please see the Internet Appendix in Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015) and 
the TAIFEX official website, http://www.taifex.com.tw/eng/eng2/TX.asp. We have also tried three other 
proxies for wealth. The first measure is the maximum order size, which is the largest order size that an 
investor submits within a year. The second and the third measures are the average open interest and the 
maximum open interest, respectively. Open interest is calculated as the maximum position that an 
investor is exposed to for one round-trip trade. The average open interest is the mean open interest of all 
round-trip trades in a year for an investor, while the maximum open interest is the maximum of an 
investor’s open interest in all round trips in a year. Regression results of using these alternative wealth 
measures are quite similar, and are not tabulated in the paper. However, the results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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measure investment performance include the limit order returns, market order returns, as well as the 
performance of the round-trip trades. As the average round-trip duration for index futures in TAIFEX is 
about two days, we look at the mark-to-market returns at the horizon of intraday, one day, and five days 
after transactions. 
The first return metric we examine is the mark-to-market return of executed limit orders that 
initiate a long or short position on the same day. We calculate the intraday returns based on the difference 
between the daily closing price and the initiated limit order’s price, divided by the latter. This calculation 
assumes that the initiated limit orders are covered (closed-out) at the closing price of the trading day. For 
each investor-year observation, we first calculate the average intraday returns, and then average them with 
equal weights for all of the observations in each quintile. We also calculate 1-day and 5-day mark-to-
market returns with closing prices on days t+1 and t+5, respectively. 
Panel A of Table IV presents the mark-to-market returns of executed limit orders. We notice that 
the Q5 individual investors significantly underperform their Q1 counterparts by 1.7 basis points within a 
trading day. The inferior performance of the Q5 investors continues to deteriorate, and the performance 
gap widens to 2.4 (6.3) basis points for the 1-day (5-day) mark-to-market returns. 
Panel A of Table IV also indicates that individual investors in all quintiles experience negative 
mark-to-market returns for their limit orders. This is consistent with the findings in Barber and Odean 




(INSERT TABLE IV HERE) 
                                                          
26
 The underperformance of superstitious individual investors, compared with their non-superstitious 
counterparts, exists not only for the limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” but also for limit 
orders submitted at prices ending with other numbers. As discussed in Hypothesis 2, a preference of lucky 
number 8 and an avoidance of unlucky number 4 would distort the optimal limit order submission 
strategy for all numbers. This suboptimal limit order submission will ultimately lead to underperformance 
for limit orders ending at all numbers. We find this to be true. The results are reported in Tables AII, AIII, 
AIV, and Figure A4, all in the Appendix. 
19 
 
The mark-to-market intraday return of a market order is calculated in the same way, i.e., 
assuming that the initiated market order is covered at the closing price of the trading day. For each 
investor-year observation, we first calculate the average intraday returns in the current year, and then 
average them with equal weights among all of the observations in each quintile. Results for mark-to-
market 1-day and 5-day returns are similarly calculated. 
Panel B of Table IV shows that Q5 individual investors significantly underperform the Q1 
individual investors by 1.3 basis points in their market orders within a trading day. The magnitude is 
similar to that of the intraday returns for limit orders. The underperformance deteriorates to 3.0 (5.6) basis 
points one day (five days) after the transactions. 
We follow Jordan and Diltz (2003) and Feng and Seasholes (2005) to calculate the performance 
of round-trip trades. A round-trip trade is defined as a newly initiated position being covered. To adjust 
for the cross-sectional variation in the round-trip duration, and to facilitate the comparison with the mark-
to-market returns of limit and market orders, we focus on the round-trip daily profit and daily index 
returns for the investors.  
The round-trip profit is calculated as the number of index points earned or lost times 200 (50) 
TWD for the TXF (MXF) contracts. We calculate the round-trip index return as the profit divided by the 
average transaction price of all buy orders within a round-trip trade.
27
 The round-trip daily profit (index 
return) is thus determined by dividing the average round-trip profit (index return) by the average round-
trip duration.
28
 Similar to the mark-to-market returns, all items are first calculated for each investor and 
then averaged with equal weights for investors in each quintile.  
Panel C of Table IV shows that the Q5 individual investors significantly underperform Q1 
individual investors by 1,199 TWD for daily profits. The realized underperformance in terms of round-
                                                          
27
 A round-trip trade may contain several buys and sells before the position is back to zero. 
28
 As round-trip trades sometimes have very short durations, the extremely short durations may lead to 
extremely large daily profits and daily index returns if we calculate the daily performance on a per round-
trip basis. To mitigate this potential outlier issue, we first calculate the average round-trip duration and 
average profit for each investor, and then we calculate the investor’s daily profit as average round-trip 
profit divided by average duration. Round-trip daily index returns are calculated in the same way. 
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trip daily index return is about 10.5 basis points per trading day. To have a better picture of the economic 
losses, we estimate the total realized profit for each investor in each quintile per year (by multiplying 
rows 1, 3, and 4 in Panel C of Table IV). The Q5 individual investors lose 105,341 TWD (roughly 3,200 
USD) more than their Q1 counterparts per year during our sample period.
29
 Such a loss is economically 
significant. It is also in line with our Hypothesis 2 that the investment performance of individual investors 
is negatively associated with their number superstition.  
Panel C of Table IV also shows that the duration of losing round-trip trades is generally longer 
than that of winning ones for individual investors. This is consistent with the findings in Odean (1998) 
that individual investors are subject to the disposition effect when making their buying and selling 
decisions. Therefore, when we conduct the multivariate regression analysis, we control for the disposition 
effect to single out the effect of number superstition on investment performance. 
 
D. Superstition Index and Investment Performance of All Investors —Multivariate Regression Analysis 
We now perform the following multivariate cross-sectional regression: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 and 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,                                           (4) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip returns for 
investor i in years t and t-1. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  is investor i’s superstition index in year t-1, calculated as the 
difference between limit order submission ratio at prices ending with “8” and that at prices ending with “4” 
in year t-1. The coefficient of particular interest is 𝛽1, as it measures how the number superstition is 
associated with investment performance. 
 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year 
t-1, which serves as a proxy for the wealth level of an investor. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 and 5,𝑖,𝑡−1  is investor i’s 
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 These incremental losses of Q5 individual investors are not driven by the excessive trading documented 
in Barber and Odean (2000) and Barber, Lee, Liu, and Odean (2009). In fact, though not tabulated, we 
find that Q5 investors trade less than their Q1 counterparts. 
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submission ratio at prices ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. Kuo, Lin, and Zhao (2015) use the limit 
order submission ratio at round number prices to proxy for an investor’s cognitive limitation. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 
is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided 
by their average. Controlling for these variables helps to single out the effect of superstition on 
investment performance. We also control for the past performance to account for the trading skill of the 
investor. 
 Table AV in the Appendix, which shows the results of the above multivariate regression, 
confirms the univariate results we documented in Table IV: superstitious investors lose money. 
The first three columns of Panel A in Table AV show significantly negative coefficients of the 
superstition index for individual investors. The estimated 𝛽1 for intraday limit order return equals -0.029, 
implying that a one-standard-deviation (0.084) increase in the superstition index results in a 0.24 basis 
points decrease in the mark-to-market intraday returns for individual investors, after controlling for 
investors’ wealth, the round number submission ratio, trading experience, disposition effect, and past 
returns. Similar results hold for the mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns. We find a similar negative 
association between the superstition index and the market order performance for individual investors in 
the middle three columns of Panel A in Table AV. The significantly negative coefficient for 5-day return 
equals -0.198, implying that a one-standard-deviation (0.084) increase of the superstition index leads to a 
1.66 basis points decrease in the mark-to-market 5-day return of market orders. The results are similar but 
less significant for the intraday and 1-day returns. The last two columns of Panel A present the 
multivariate regression results for the round-trip trades. The round-trip performance is negatively 
associated with the superstition index as well. A one-standard-deviation (0.084) increase in the 
superstition index leads to a lower (721 TWD) round-trip daily profit and a lower (5.84 basis points) daily 
index return.  
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Notice that the negative association between the superstition and investment performance in 
Panel A of Table AV remains significant even after controlling for wealth, cognitive limitation, trading 
experience, disposition effect, and past performance. This indicates that our superstition measure captures 
a distinct individual investor characteristic.
30
 Furthermore, we find that 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  is negatively 
related to the investment performance of individual investors, suggesting that the more an investor 
exhibits the disposition effect, the lower are the returns of his investments. This is consistent with the 
findings in Odean (1998). 
To summarize, both the main quintile analysis in Table IV and the subsequent regression 
exercises shown in Table AV in the Appendix provide evidence that the superstition index is negatively 
associated with the investment performance of individual investors. The more an investor is influenced by 
superstitious beliefs when deciding the limit order price, the poorer is his investment performance. This is 
true for individual investors, but not true for institutional investors as shown in Panels B and C of Table 
AV in the Appendix. Overall, the results provide compelling evidence to support Hypothesis 2.  
 
E. Two-Stage Regression Analysis 
To further support that superstition captures a unique dimension of trading skills, we perform a 
two-stage regression analysis. In the first stage, we regress superstition index on proxies for other aspects 
of trading skills.  
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1,                                                                                                 (5) 
where 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-
1, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is investor i’s submission ratio at prices ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1, 
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 We also perform a double sorting analysis where we sort individual investors into quintiles by the 
superstition index and the submission ratio at the round number prices (the cognitive ability measure in 
Kuo, Lin, and Zhao, 2015). The result shows that the underperformance of the most superstitious (Q5) 
individual investors is larger for investors with lower submission ratio at round number prices. This 
indicates that our superstition index is different from the cognitive ability measure. These results are 
reported in Table AVI in the Appendix. 
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𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year, and 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  is the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of 
investor i in yaer t-1, divided by their average. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average mark-to-market returns or 
round-trip returns for investor i in year t-1. 
Panel A of Table AVII in the Appendix (first-stage regression) shows that superstition is 
significantly related to other aspects of trading skill. The wealthier and more experienced investors have 
lower superstition indices, while investors who are more affected by the disposition effect tend to be more 
superstitious. 
We take the residuals from Eq. (5) and perform the following second stage regression. By doing 
so, we single out the effect of superstition from other aspects of trading skills. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (6) 
Panel B of Table AVII in the Appendix (second-stage regression) presents the results of our 
second stage regression. They show that the residual superstition index, which is the portion of 
superstition that cannot be explained by other known trading characteristics, is still negatively associated 
with investment performance. In particular, the coefficients of limit order returns are all significantly 
negative. This implies that superstition does capture a unique dimension of trading skills that is related to 
investment performance. 
 
F. Placebo Tests  
To show that our negative association between superstition and investment performance is not a 
statistical fluke, we conduct two placebo tests in this subsection. The first and the natural one is to check 
the negative link between superstition and trading performance for institutional investors. Since the limit 
order submission of institutional investors is supposedly not affected by the lucky/unlucky numbers, the 
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superstition index should not be associated with investment performance for these investors. This is 
exactly what we find in Panel B (domestic institutions) and Panel C (QFII) of Table AV in the Appendix. 
For the second placebo test, we construct a pseudo superstition index based on the difference 
between the submission ratios at “7” and “3,” and repeat the regression analysis of Eq. (4). The numbers 
“7” and “3” are deemed neither lucky nor unlucky in Chinese culture. Therefore, the pseudo superstition 
index should not capture the degree of superstition among investors, nor should it be linked to investment 
performance. 
Table AVIII in the Appendix shows that the negative association does not exist between the 
pseudo superstition index and investment performance among individual investors. The parameter 
estimates of 𝛽1 are not significant at the 10% level in any of the columns. We also consider two more 
pseudo superstition indices: the differences between submission ratios at “7” and “2” and at “2” and “3.” 
We do not find significant association between these two pseudo superstition indices and investment 
performance either (results not tabulated). This further corroborates our Hypothesis 2 that superstitious 
individual investors, who tend to favor the number “8” and avoid the number “4,” incur worse investment 
performance than their non-superstitious counterparts. 
 
G. The Lucky vs. Unlucky Side of Superstition Index  
The superstition index consists of two parts: the submission ratio at “8” (the lucky number part) 
and the submission ratio at “4” (the unlucky number part). In this subsection, we examine if the 
association between superstition and investment performance is driven by a particular part. We consider 
the lucky part of the superstition index as the difference between the submission ratios at “8” and “3,” 
while the unlucky one as the difference between the submission ratios at “3” and “4.” Number “3” is ideal 
to serve as a benchmark because it is a neutral number that is neither a round number nor adjacent to the 




We repeat the regression analysis of Eq. (4) with these two proxies for the lucky and unlucky 
parts of the superstition index as our main variables of interest. Table AIX in the Appendix shows that the 
negative association between superstition and investment performance exists for both parts, though it is 
more significant for the lucky part. It indicates that the tendency of individual investors both to favor the 
number “8” and to avoid the number “4” is negatively related to their investment performance.  
 
V. Why do Superstitious Individual Investors Lose Money? 
In this section we explore the potential reasons why superstitious individual investors lose money. In 
financial markets, there are only two ways in which investors could lose by trading: picking the wrong 
investment and/or picking it at the wrong time. In our setting, the only investment is the index futures. So 
the only way for individual investors to lose money would be bad market timing. We first investigate 
whether superstitious investors exhibit poor market timing and then examine how it happens. 
 
A. Market Timing 
Following Seasholes and Zhu (2010), we calculate the Buy Ratio and Buy-Sell Ratio for 
individual investors with various superstition indices and under different market returns to gauge their 
market timing abilities. The Buy Ratio is defined as the number of buy contracts (taking long positions) 
scaled by total number of executed contracts. We calculate the Buy-Sell Ratio as the difference between 
the numbers of buy and sell contracts, divided by their average. Both open limit and market orders are 
included in the calculation of Buy Ratio and Buy-Sell Ratio. If superstitious investors are indeed poor 
market timers, we would expect them to have lower Buy Ratio and Buy-Sell Ratio, compared with their 
non-superstitious counterparts, on the trading days with high market returns. 
We first sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year. Investors in 
the superstitious index quintile 5 (Q5) are the most superstitious. We then sort the trading days of the next 
year into quintiles based on the daily market returns. Market returns on trading days in Quintile-5 (M5) 
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are the highest. We then compute the average Buy Ratio and average Buy-Sell Ratio of each product 
(MXF or TXF orders with all available maturity dates) for the investors in each superstitious quintile and 
market return quintile. 
The results are reported in Table V. The last row of Panel A in Table V shows that the difference 
between the Buy Ratios of M5 and M1 market returns is significantly negative (-0.122) for Q5 individual 
investors. The result indicates that Q5 individual investors (the most superstitious ones) tend to establish 
larger long positions on the trading days with lower market returns than on the trading days with higher 
market returns. In contrast, this difference is insignificant (-0.012) for Q1 individual investors (the least 
superstitious ones). This suggests that Q5 individual investors in general have poorer market timing 
ability than their Q1 counterparts. Furthermore, we can see that such a difference in marketing timing 
ability between Q5 and Q1 investors is mainly manifest on the trading days with low market returns. So 
Q5 investors buy more than Q1 investors in low market return days, but the difference is not significant in 
high market return days. Panel B of Table V shows similar results for Buy-Sell Ratio. This evidence 
suggests that indeed bad market timing is responsible for the underperformance of the most superstitious 
investors. 
(INSERT TABLE V HERE) 
We also conduct a placebo test to see if we can replicate the results of Table V based on a pseudo 
superstition index – the difference between the submission ratios at “7” and “3” – instead of the actual 
superstition index – the difference between the submission ratios at “8” and “4”. According to the results 
shown in Table AX in the Appendix, we notice no relation between the pseudo-superstition index and 
market timing ability. 
 
B. Stale Limit Orders 
Why are superstitious investors poor market timers? It could be the case that individual investors 
submit their limit orders without active monitoring, and then their orders become stale and eventually get 
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picked off by active traders. Linnainmaa (2010) shows that stale limit orders can partly explain the poor 
performance of individual investors in Finland. In order to check if individual limit orders become stale 
after submission, we examine the time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation of the orders in this 
subsection. 
Time-to-execution is the time elapsed between order submission and order execution for executed 
limit orders. Time-to-cancellation is the time elapsed between order submission and order cancellation for 
limit orders that are submitted and then deleted by individual investors. Both measures can serve as an 
indicator of how actively investors monitor their limit orders. We first sort individual investors into 
quintiles according to their superstition indices in one year, and plot the average time-to-execution 
(cancellation) of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” in the subsequent year. X is an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9. As usual, investors in Quintile-5 (Q5) are the most superstitious. 
Figure 2.A shows that for the limit orders submitted at various prices, Q5 investors have longer 
time-to-execution than Q1 investors. Similarly, Figure 2.B shows that the time-to-cancellation is also 
longer for Q5 investors at all price points. The differences in time-to-execution (cancellation) of Q5 and 
Q1 investors are significant (results not tabulated). In sum, our results are consistent with the conjecture 
that the limit orders of the most superstitious individual investors are left unattended in the limit order 
book for a longer time such that they become stale and eventually get picked off, partially contributing to 
their underperformance.  
(INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE) 
 We also perform a regression analysis to show that the time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation 
are indeed related to investment performance. Table AXI in the Appendix shows that investors who have 
stale limit orders, namely, investors with longer time-to-execution and longer time-to-cancellation, tend to 
incur poorer investment performance. This must be because someone is exploiting their predictable trades 
by, for example, picking off their stale limit orders. The question is: who are these investors? We show 
that institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, make money at all price points from the most 
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superstitious traders. As shown in Figure A5 in the Appendix, both domestic and foreign intuitional 
investors earn more higher positive returns at all price points when they pick up the orders submitted by 
Q5 individual investors as compared to those submitted by Q1 individual investors. Our results indicate 
that the superstitious individual investors are losing to the more sophisticated institutional investors. 
 
VI. Superstition and Learning by Trading 
In this section, we examine whether individual investors learn by trading to mitigate or reinforce 
their reliance on superstition in limit order submissions, as proposed by our Hypotheses 3.A and 3.B, 
respectively. Specifically, we perform the following regression: 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                                                           (7) 
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 are the superstition indices of investor i in years t and t-1. We use the change in 
superstition index to control for unobserved time-invariant investor characteristics. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) is the log 
of the number of limit orders submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market 
intraday return of limit orders submitted by investor i at prices ending with “8” in year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted by investor i at prices ending with “4” in 
year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted by investor i at 
prices ending with other numbers in year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of 
market orders submitted by investor i in year t-1. We also control for the past superstition index, wealth, 
disposition effect, and the round-number submission ratio. The superstition index is expressed in 
percentage to facilitate comparison of estimated coefficients. The coefficients of interest are 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4, 




Table VI shows that the change in the superstition index is significantly negatively related to the 
number of limit orders submitted by individual investor in the previous year. According to the estimated 
𝛽1 in Model 6, a one-standard-deviation (51 limit orders) increase in the number of submitted limit orders 
in the previous year will lead to 0.74% more reduction of the superstition index in the subsequent year. 
This indicates that individual investors learn from their past trading frequency and rely less on 
superstitious heuristics in their limit order submission.  
The significantly negative coefficients of 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡−1 suggest that individual investors with 
better performance of non-superstitious limit orders are able to learn to become less superstitious. In 
contrast, the coefficients of 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 are statistically insignificant, indicating that 
individual investors do not learn in a reinforcement way. This result is not surprising as we have shown in 
Tables AII, AIII, AIV, and Figure A4 that superstitious individual investors perform poorly at all 
numbers. For the most superstitious investors, there seems to be no particularly high return at “8” or a 
particularly low return on “4,” compared with other numbers; so it is likely that that these investors do not 
learn from performance of limit orders submitted at these lucky/unlucky numbers. In sum, our results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3.A that individual investors learn by trading to alleviate their number 
superstition in limit order submissions.  
(INSERT TABLE VI HERE) 
 Does the effect of trading experience diminish over time? We reproduce Table VI by replacing 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) with 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−2) and 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−3), respectively. Doing so allows us to examine the relative 
importance of the past trading experience accumulated two or three years before. Table AXII in the 
Appendix shows that the 𝛽1of 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−2) is less negative than that of 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1), and the 𝛽1of 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−3) 
is insignificant. Our results suggest that the impact of the past trading frequency is diminishing over time. 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper documents that individual investors exhibit number superstition when submitting limit 
orders. The limit order submission ratio at the lucky number “8” is 0.098, which is significantly higher 
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than 0.063, the submission ratio at the unlucky number “4.” We also find that there exist both persistence 
and cross-sectional heterogeneity in the degree that investors are affected by their superstitious beliefs. 
We construct an investor-level superstition index based on the limit order submission ratios at 
lucky and unlucky numbers and show that this index is negatively related to investment performance. 
Specifically, we find that more superstitious individual investors incur significantly lower intraday, 1-day, 
and 5-day mark-to-market index returns of their limit orders. In addition, we find similar 
underperformance of superstitious individual investors for their market orders and round-trip trades. The 
negative association between superstition index and subsequent investment performance remains 
significant even after controlling for known investor characteristics that have been shown in the literature 
to be related to investment performance. Thus, our findings show that the number superstition captures a 
distinct aspect of investors’ trading skills. 
Finally, we find that superstitious individual investors underperform because they have bad 
market timing (mostly because they buy on days when the market return are low) and have stale limit 
orders which get picked off by smarter traders. The good news is that individual investors can learn from 
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Limit Order Quotes and Trades 
 
This table reports the summary statistics of the limit orders quotes and trades for two major Taiwan index 
futures in the Taiwan Futures Exchange from January 2003 to September 2008. In 2008, we only have 
orders and trades data from January to September. The number of submitted limit orders and the number 
of executed limit order contracts are reported in Panels A and B, respectively. The number of limit orders 
(contracts) is reported separately for individual investors, domestic institutions, and Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) and for Taiwan Stock Exchange Futures (TXF) and Mini-Taiwan Stock 
Exchange Futures (MXF).  
 
Panel A: Number of Limit Orders Submitted 
Year Total  Investor type Product type 
    Individual 
Domestic 
Institutions 
QFII TXF MXF 
2003 8,391,970 7,874,288 450,329 67,353 5,931,492 2,460,478 
2004 11,756,902 10,436,137 1,181,927 138,838 7,935,143 3,821,759 
2005 9,336,187 7,171,025 1,866,537 298,625 6,853,377 2,482,810 
2006 16,080,187 10,088,540 5,160,370 831,277 11,136,616 4,943,571 
2007 26,218,095 13,297,493 11,732,794 1,187,808 15,728,641 10,489,454 
2008 36,699,943 18,251,513 16,677,852 1,770,578 21,843,993 14,855,950 
       Total 108,483,284 67,118,996 37,069,809 4,294,479 69,429,262 39,054,022 
Ratio 100% 61.87% 34.17% 3.96% 64.00% 36.00% 
 
Panel B: Number of Limit Order Contracts Executed 
Year Total  Investor type Product type 
    Individual 
Domestic 
Institutions 
QFII MXF TXF 
2003 15,662,806 13,369,496 1,960,223 333,087 13,029,382 2,633,424 
2004 21,609,094 17,067,248 3,667,074 874,772 17,722,556 3,886,538 
2005 16,011,798 11,495,469 3,445,196 1,071,133 13,834,750 2,177,048 
2006 23,351,164 16,690,861 5,288,886 1,371,417 19,829,998 3,521,166 
2007 29,554,384 20,294,809 6,882,178 2,377,397 23,626,300 5,928,084 
2008 36,963,929 25,873,811 8,470,446 2,619,672 25,871,823 11,092,106 
       Total 143,153,175 104,791,694 29,714,003 8,647,478 113,914,809 29,238,366 








Table II. Submission Ratio at Prices Ending with “X” 
 
This table reports the parameter estimates of the following regression: 
 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑋 − 0.1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐷8 + 𝛽2𝐷4 + 𝛽3𝐷0 + 𝛽4𝐷5 + (𝛽5𝐷8 + 𝛽6𝐷4 + 𝛽7𝐷0 + 𝛽8𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣
+ (𝛽9𝐷8 + 𝛽10𝐷4 + 𝛽11𝐷0 + 𝛽12𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 + (𝛽13𝐷8 + 𝛽14𝐷4 + 𝛽15𝐷0 + 𝛽16𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹
+ (𝛽17𝐷8 + 𝛽18𝐷4 + 𝛽19𝐷0 + 𝛽20𝐷5) × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + (𝛽21𝐷8 + 𝛽22𝐷4 + 𝛽23𝐷0 + 𝛽24𝐷5)
× 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + 𝛽25𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 + 𝛽26𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽27𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 + 𝜀𝑋 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑋 is the submission ratio at “X”, which is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at 
prices ending with “X” divided by total number of limit orders submitted at all prices (X is an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9). The dependent variable is the deviation of the actual submission ratio at “X” from 
its theoretical value assuming uniform distribution of the limit order prices. Each year, the submission 
ratio at “X” is calculated separately for individual investors, domestic institutions, and QFII investors, and 
for MXF and TXF orders. 𝐷8, 𝐷4, 𝐷0, and 𝐷5 are dummy variables for X=8, 4, 0, and 5, respectively. 
𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 and 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 are indicators for individual and QFII investors. 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 is equal to 1 if the order is to trade 
MXF, and 0 if it is to trade TXF. In the last three rows we report the F-tests for the equality of coefficients. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.5 
and 0.01, respectively.  
 
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
          
𝐷8 0.013*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.479) (0.544) 
𝐷4 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.243) (0.456) (0.359) (0.418) (0.503) 
𝐷0 0.111*** 0.041*** 0.086*** 0.016 0.037*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.182) (0.000) 
𝐷5 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.035*** -0.001 0.008** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.810) (0.021) 
Double Interactions      








































































𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
0.004 0.004 0.005 
   






𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
-0.002 -0.002 0.009 
   
(0.801) (0.720) (0.149) 
𝐷0 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
0.050** 0.050*** 0.008 
   
(0.030) (0.002) (0.672) 
𝐷5 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
0.021** 0.021*** 0.002 
   
(0.028) (0.003) (0.793) 
Triple Interactions    
𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
-0.001 
     
(0.927) 
𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
-0.012** 
     
(0.042) 
𝐷0 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
0.036* 
     
(0.091) 
𝐷5 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
0.017** 
     
(0.032) 
𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
-0.001 
     
(0.903) 
𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
-0.019 
     
(0.134) 
𝐷0 × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
0.089** 
     
(0.034) 
𝐷5 × 𝐷𝑄𝐹𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
    
0.042** 






















-0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
   
(0.025) (0.014) (0.015) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.002 -0.009** 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.008) (0.613) (0.023) (0.806) (0.821) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 357 357 357 357 357 
Adjusted R
2
 0.581 0.751 0.606 0.779 0.797 
      
F-test 
     𝐷8 − 𝐷4 0.017*** 0.002 0.014*** -0.001 0.004
 
(0.000) (0.578) (0.000) (0.833) (0.305) 


















𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 − 𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
0.006 0.006 -0.004 
   
(0.394) (0.260) (0.624) 
𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 − 𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
  
0.011 
     
(0.169) 
𝐷8 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹 − 𝐷4 × 𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑣 × 𝐷𝑀𝑋𝐹  
   
0.018 






Table III. Superstition Index and Related Individual Investor Traits 
 
In this table we report the correlations between the superstition index and other individual investor traits. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡  are investor i’s 
superstition indices in two consecutive years t-1 and t, calculated as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” In each 
year, we calculate the investor’s submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total 
number of limit orders submitted at all prices. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the average number of 
contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡 is investor i’s submission ratio in year t at prices ending with “0” and 
“5.” 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡) is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i within year t. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the difference between the durations of 
losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t, divided by their average. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the superstition index, 
we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. The p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
 Correlations 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 1.0000 
     
       𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 0.4205*** 1.0000 
    
 
(0.000) 
     𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -0.0229*** -0.0223*** 1.0000 
   
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
    𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡 -0.0821*** -0.1134*** -0.0409*** 1.0000 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡) 0.0043*** -0.0037 0.0894*** -0.1915*** 1.0000 
 
 
(0.0936) (0.1474) (0.000) (0.000) 
  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 0.0475*** 0.0421*** -0.0322*** -0.0185*** 0.0790*** 1.0000 








Table IV. Superstition Index and Investment Performance of Individual Investors – Quintile Analysis 
 
In this table, we sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, and report their returns in the subsequent year. Panel 
A shows the mark-to-market returns of limit orders. Panel B shows the mark-to-market returns of market orders. Mark-to-market intraday return is 
the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated 
in a similar fashion. Panel C shows the performance of round-trip trades. Round-trip duration is the number of trading days between the initiating 
and closing positions of a round-trip trade. For each investor, we calculate the round-trip daily profit and daily index return as the average round-
trip profit or index return divided by the average round-trip duration. In all panels, Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more superstitious. In each year, 
we calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” We calculate the 
investor’s submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders 
submitted at all prices. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. All items are first calculated for each investor-year 
observation and then averaged for each quintile with equal weights. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of superstition index, we require that 
investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor 
performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Mark-To-Market Returns of Limit Orders 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday (%) -0.078 -0.088 -0.087 -0.086 -0.095 -0.017***  0.000 
1-day (%) -0.111 -0.136 -0.126 -0.128 -0.135 -0.024***  0.000 
5-day (%) -0.179 -0.240 -0.219 -0.211 -0.242 -0.063***  0.000 
Panel B: Mark-To-Market Returns of Market Orders 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Intraday (%) -0.039 -0.055 -0.048 -0.055 -0.052 -0.013**   0.015 
1-day (%) -0.070 -0.097 -0.101 -0.099 -0.099 -0.030**   0.011 
5-day (%) -0.146 -0.11 -0.192 -0.195 -0.203 -0.056**   0.015 
Panel C: Round-Trip Performance 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Round-trip daily profit (TWD) -1,002  -1,690  -1,526  -2,322  -2,201  -1,199*   0.096 
Round-trip daily index return (%) -0.076 -0.135 -0.134 -0.195 -0.181 -0.105*   0.065 
Number of round-trip trades 61 58 67 54 43 -18***   0.000 
Round-trip duration (day) 2.256 2.555 2.273 2.293 2.570 0.314***   0.000 
Duration of winning round-trips (day) 1.922 2.130 1.908 1.875 2.086 0.164***   0.000 






Table V. Individual Investors’ Superstition Index, Market Return, and the Buy Ratio and Buy-sell Ratio – Quintile Analysis 
 
In this table we report the Buy Ratio and Buy-sell Ratio for individual investors with various superstition indices and under different market 
returns. We first sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year. Investors in quantile 5 (Q%) of the superstitious 
index are the most superstitious. We then sort the trading days of the next year into quintiles based on the daily market returns. Market returns on 
trading days in Quintile-5 (M5) are the highest. We then compute the average Buy Ratio and average Buy-Sell Ratio of each product (MXF or 
TXF orders that expire in one month, two months, three months, six months, nine months, or one year) for the investors in each superstitious 
quintile and market return quintile. We define 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4” for investor i in year t-
1. We calculate the investor’s submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number 
of limit orders submitted at all prices. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. The Buy Ratio is calculated as the number of 
buy contracts (taking long positions) scaled by total number of executed contracts. We calculate the Buy-sell Ratio as the difference between the 
numbers of buy and sell contracts, divided by their average. Both limit and market orders are included in the calculation of Buy Ratio and Buy-sell 
Ratio. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive 
years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Buy Ratio 
Quintile Ranks of Quintile Ranks of 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1   
Market Return Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
M1 0.625  0.667  0.633  0.678  0.723  0.098***   0.000 
M2 0.587  0.618  0.613  0.635  0.659  0.073***   0.000 
M3 0.595  0.608  0.613  0.623  0.640  0.045***   0.000 
M4 0.625  0.605  0.611  0.614  0.630    0.004   0.593 
M5 0.614  0.583  0.604  0.603  0.601   -0.013   0.107 
        Diff (M5-M1)  -0.012 -0.084*** -0.029*** -0.076*** -0.122*** 








Panel B: Buy-Sell Ratio 
Quintile Ranks of Quintile Ranks of 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1   
Market Return Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
M1 0.502  0.668  0.533  0.713  0.893  0.391***   0.000 
M2 0.346  0.473  0.450  0.540  0.636  0.290***   0.000 
M3 0.380  0.433  0.451  0.490  0.559  0.178***   0.000 
M4 0.502  0.419  0.446  0.457  0.519    0.017   0.593 
M5 0.455  0.333  0.415  0.411  0.403   -0.052   0.107 
        Diff (M5-M1)  -0.047 -0.335*** -0.118*** -0.302*** -0.490*** 






Table VI. Investors’ Learning and Superstition 
In this table we report the parameter estimates from the following regression for individual investors: 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑋 
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  are the superstition indices in year t and t-1, and they are calculated as the 
difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4” in each year. We calculate the investor’s 
submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the 
total number of limit orders submitted at all prices. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar 
fashion. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) is the log of the number of limit orders submitted at year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” at year t-1. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “4” at 
year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖,𝑡−1  is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted at prices 
ending with other numbers at year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of market 
orders at year t-1. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  is the average number of contracts per limit order at year t-1. 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices ending with “0” and “5” at year 
t-1. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the disposition effect, which is calculated as the difference between winning and 
losing round-trip trades, divided by the average of the two at year t-1. We require that investors must 
submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years, and we express the superstition index 
in percentage. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
Independent 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 (%)  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.096*** 




































    
0.036 0.032 
     
(0.709) (0.772) 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 (%) -0.434*** -0.368*** -0.414*** -0.434*** -0.421*** -0.333*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.047*** -0.031** -0.054*** -0.050*** -0.040*** -0.013 
 
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.293) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.932*** -0.855*** 0.255 -0.823*** -0.539*** -0.017 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.001) (0.940) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.279*** 0.294*** 0.258*** 0.265*** 0.188*** 0.207*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 2.785*** 1.653*** 1.767*** 2.243*** 2.059*** 2.274*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 56,260 47,462 40,029 56,169 32,890 22,298 
Adjusted R
2





Figure 1. Limit Order Submission Ratios at Various Prices 
 
In this figure, we report the limit order submission ratios at prices ending with “X” (X is an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9). The submission ratio at “X” is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at 
"X" divided by the total number of submitted limit orders. We report the figures separately for individual 
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 Figure 2. Time-to-execution and Time-to-cancellation of Individual Investors’ Limit Orders 
 
In this table we sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, and plot the 
time-to-execution and time-to-cancellation of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” in the 
subsequent year. (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are most superstitious. In 
each year, we calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order 
submission ratios at “8” and “4.” The submission ratio at “8” is calculated as the number of limit orders 
submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices. 
The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. Time-to-execution is the interval from order 
submission to execution for executed limit orders. Time-to-cancellation is the interval from submission to 
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 Table AI. Descriptive Statistics of the Superstition Index 
 
In this table, we report the summary statistics of the investor-level superstition index. In each year, we calculate the superstition index for each 
investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” The submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the 
number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The 
submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the superstition index, we require that investors 
submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. In 2008, we only have data for the first nine months. 
 
Panel A: Individual Investors 
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile 80th Percentile 
2003 0.0365  0.0292  0.0764  0.0000  0.0152  0.0435  0.0805  
2004 0.0408  0.0323  0.0799  0.0000  0.0185  0.0462  0.0833  
2005 0.0413  0.0323  0.0848  0.0000  0.0172  0.0476  0.0889  
2006 0.0425  0.0324  0.0836  0.0000  0.0189  0.0465  0.0857  
2007 0.0424  0.0303  0.0855  0.0000  0.0175  0.0439  0.0833  
2008 0.0493  0.0333  0.0909  0.0000  0.0213  0.0474  0.0882  
 
Panel B: Domestic Institutions 
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile 80th Percentile 
2003 0.0273  0.0158  0.0820  -0.0187  0.0000  0.0321  0.0690  
2004 0.0359  0.0241  0.0828  -0.0083  0.0124  0.0364  0.0667  
2005 0.0285  0.0223  0.0733  -0.0098  0.0114  0.0364  0.0684  
2006 0.0186  0.0132  0.0660  -0.0114  0.0040  0.0270  0.0588  
2007 0.0221  0.0146  0.0613  -0.0144  0.0000  0.0258  0.0601  
2008 0.0328  0.0192  0.0712  -0.0065  0.0088  0.0313  0.0696  
 
Panel C: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
Year Mean Median Standard Deviation 20th Percentile 40th Percentile 60th Percentile 80th Percentile 
2003 0.0005  0.0063  0.0356  -0.0258  0.0048  0.0157  0.0232  
2004 0.0084  0.0124  0.0223  0.0037  0.0055  0.0140  0.0204  
2005 -0.0087  -0.0037  0.0447  -0.0134  -0.0055  0.0000  0.0198  
2006 0.0172  0.0063  0.0334  -0.0010  0.0034  0.0098  0.0335  
2007 0.0150  0.0099  0.0347  -0.0131  0.0044  0.0176  0.0336  






Table AII. Individual Investors’ Superstition and Mark-to-market Returns of Limit Orders at “8,” “4,” “0,” and other Numbers – 
Quintile Analysis 
 
In this table, we sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, and report the subsequent year’s mark-to-market 
return of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8,” “4,” “0,” and other numbers. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more superstitious. In each 
year, we calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” The submission 
ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit 
orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. Mark-to-market intraday return is the 
difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in 
a similar fashion. All items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged for each quintile with equal weights. To ensure 
a reasonable magnitude of superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. The 
Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Quintile Ranks Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Mark-to-market returns of limit orders submitted at prices ending with "8" 
Intraday (%) -0.056 -0.056 -0.055 -0.068 -0.073 -0.017***   0.002 
1-day (%) -0.076 -0.102 -0.084 -0.109 -0.110 -0.034***   0.002 
5-day (%) -0.063 -0.153 -0.117 -0.134 -0.166 -0.103***   0.000 
Mark-to-market returns of limit orders submitted at prices ending with "4" 
Intraday (%) -0.054 -0.061 -0.059 -0.061 -0.065 -0.011*   0.099 
1-day (%) -0.081 -0.103 -0.097 -0.095 -0.089  -0.008   0.535 
5-day (%) -0.148 -0.176 -0.172 -0.175 -0.154  -0.006   0.821 
Mark-to-market returns of limit orders submitted at prices ending with "0" 
Intraday (%) -0.074 -0.089 -0.089 -0.084 -0.094 -0.020***   0.000 
1-day (%) -0.111 -0.128 -0.126 -0.119 -0.131 -0.021**   0.016 
5-day (%) -0.185 -0.241 -0.208 -0.183 -0.221 -0.036**   0.042 
Mark-to-market returns of limit orders submitted at other prices 
Intraday (%) -0.076 -0.086 -0.085 -0.084 -0.097 -0.021***   0.000 
1-day (%) -0.110 -0.132 -0.123 -0.128 -0.138 -0.027***   0.000 







Table AIII. Individual Investors’ Superstition and Mark-to-market Returns of Limit Orders at 
Prices Ending with “X” – Regression Analysis 
 
In this table, we report the parameter estimates from the following regression: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛽2𝐷8 + 𝛽3𝐷4 + 𝛽4𝐷0) × 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷8 + 𝛽6𝐷4 + 𝛽7𝐷0
+ 𝛽8𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑋,𝑖,𝑡 is the performance of individual limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” for 
investor i in year t (X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). 𝐷8, 𝐷4, and 𝐷0 are dummy variables for X=8, 4, 
and 0, respectively. Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference between the trade price and the daily 
closing price divided by the trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in a 
similar fashion. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  is the superstition index of investor i in year t-1, and it is calculated as the 
difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” The submission ratio at “8” of an investor 
is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number 
of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar 
fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year 
t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices ending with “0” and “5” in 
year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  is the log of the number of limit orders submitted by investor i in year t-1. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the disposition effect, which is calculated as the difference between the durations of 
losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
average intraday, 1-day, or 5-day mark-to-market return for investor i in year t-1. To ensure a reasonable 
magnitude of the superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of 
two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
Independent Mark-to-market Return of Limit Orders (%) 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day 
        
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.072*** -0.094* -0.220** 
 
(0.000) (0.054) (0.014) 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷8 -0.016 0.046 0.028 
 
(0.666) (0.555) (0.858) 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷4 -0.050 -0.162 0.125 
 
(0.381) (0.177) (0.596) 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷0 -0.003 -0.082 -0.084 
 
(0.947) (0.311) (0.599) 
𝐷8 0.011*** 0.002 0.010 
 
(0.002) (0.772) (0.491) 
𝐷4 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.032* 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.055) 
𝐷0 0.002 0.016*** 0.026** 
 
(0.406) (0.004) (0.028) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** 0.000 -0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.624) (0.230) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.039*** -0.084*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 





𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.027*** -0.035*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.015*** 0.005 0.008** 
 
(0.000) (0.185) (0.026) 
Constant -0.052*** -0.083*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 176,888 176,622 172,041 
Adjusted R
2







Table AIV. Number of “X”s Where Superstitious Individual Investors Underperform 
 
In this table, we sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, and examine 
the performance of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” in the subsequent year (X is an 
integer ranging from 0 to 9). We report the number of “X”s where Quintile-5 investors (significantly) 
underperform Quintile-1 investors. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more superstitious. In each year, we 
calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at 
“8” and “4.” The submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders 
submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices 
within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. The underperformance is 
determined based on the intraday, 1-day, as well as 5-day mark-to-market returns of limit orders. Mark-to-
market intraday return is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the 
trade price. Mark-to-market 1-day and 5-day returns are calculated in a similar fashion. To ensure a 
reasonable magnitude of superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in 
each of two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-value assumes unequal variances of investor 
performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
 
Significance Number of "X"s where Q-5 individual investors underperform Q-1 investors 
 Level Intraday 1-day 5-day 
p<1 10 10 10 
p<0.1 10 10 10 
p<0.05 10 10 10 







Table AV. Superstition Index and Investment Performance of All Investors – Regression Analysis 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i in year t and year t-1. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
investor i’s superstition index in year t-1, calculated as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” In each year, we 
calculate the investor’s submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of 
limit orders submitted at all prices. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average number of 
contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices ending with 
“0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. Mark-to-market return 
of limit (market) orders is the return under the assumption that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the closing price of a trading day. 
The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by the average round-trip 
duration for each investor. Results for individual (Panel A) and institutional investors (Panels B and C) are reported separately. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders 







Panel A: Individual Investors 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.029*** -0.035* -0.090** -0.014 -0.092 -0.198* -8,589.073* -0.696* 
 
(0.003) (0.094) (0.045) (0.627) (0.120) (0.090) (0.065) (0.064) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -345.576 -0.022 
 
(0.001) (0.745) (0.425) (0.672) (0.861) (0.169) (0.556) (0.632) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.023*** -0.050*** -0.096*** -0.017* -0.050*** -0.076* 14,317.476 1.171 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.009) (0.053) (0.341) (0.337) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.009** 0.006 2,450.266 0.200 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) (0.012) (0.427) (0.209) (0.205) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.011** -0.012*** -0.015** -0.003 4,354.670 0.352 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.019) (0.798) (0.375) (0.377) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.007** 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.057** 0.056** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.021) (0.525) (0.825) (0.878) (0.033) (0.050) 
Constant -0.101*** -0.132*** -0.269*** -0.048*** -0.077*** -0.144*** -22,735.463 -1.848 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.190) (0.188) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 140,724 140,700 140,180 53,412 53,260 51,247 140,608 140,608 
Adjusted R
2








Panel B: Domestic Institutions 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.210 -0.630 -1.731 1.067* 1.603 0.909 -30,441.496 -2.953 
 (0.250) (0.164) (0.136) (0.090) (0.108) (0.697) (0.852) (0.804) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.006 -2,702.743 -0.152 
 (0.626) (0.149) (0.292) (0.516) (0.473) (0.882) (0.625) (0.684) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.094 -0.298* -0.067 -0.239 -0.239 0.781 -109,654.930** -4.246 
 (0.154) (0.070) (0.822) (0.234) (0.577) (0.329) (0.038) (0.271) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 -0.029 0.021 -43,337.750*** -1.131 
 (0.720) (0.337) (0.951) (0.860) (0.381) (0.765) (0.006) (0.332) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.050*** -0.143*** -0.255*** 0.051 0.155 0.020 -80,629.523*** -5.759*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.322) (0.111) (0.919) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.100 -0.033 0.034 -0.107 -0.247 -0.205 0.043 0.008 
 (0.140) (0.645) (0.480) (0.340) (0.129) (0.110) (0.817) (0.965) 
Constant 0.045 0.214 0.181 0.091 0.256 -0.351 297,375.906*** 8.687 
 (0.449) (0.109) (0.492) (0.424) (0.393) (0.588) (0.002) (0.218) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 563 563 561 259 256 244 554 554 
Adjusted R
2







Panel C: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.491 -0.558 0.947 3.355* -2.177 8.292 -3740699.500 -193.907 
 
(0.441) (0.750) (0.763) (0.083) (0.619) (0.162) (0.190) (0.314) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.012 0.037 0.105 26,424.318 1.699 
 
(0.416) (0.348) (0.689) (0.279) (0.203) (0.195) (0.432) (0.484) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.021 -0.686** -1.127** 0.211 -0.237 1.224 -100,800.758 -2.970 
 
(0.860) (0.034) (0.022) (0.594) (0.760) (0.370) (0.842) (0.926) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.007 -0.008 0.081* 0.017 0.000 -0.077 81,184.500 7.761** 
 
(0.447) (0.799) (0.092) (0.648) (0.999) (0.698) (0.107) (0.030) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.031 -0.008 0.091 -0.004 0.044 0.173 -43,563.090 -1.666 
 
(0.270) (0.859) (0.533) (0.946) (0.789) (0.680) (0.838) (0.914) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.138 0.024 0.044 0.060 0.282 -0.159 -0.017 -0.047 
 
(0.195) (0.829) (0.734) (0.713) (0.132) (0.453) (0.864) (0.597) 
Constant 0.005 0.627 0.448 -0.053 -0.196 -1.158 1348741.250 104.336 
 
(0.967) (0.140) (0.433) (0.894) (0.837) (0.645) (0.302) (0.299) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 166 165 165 65 64 60 153 153 
Adjusted R
2







Table AVI. Superstition, Cognitive Limitation, and Intraday Mark-to-market Returns of Limit Orders of Individual Investors 
 
In this table we double sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index and the submission ratio at “0” in year t-1, and report the 
intraday mark-to-market return of limit orders in year t. Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more superstitious or have higher submission ratios at round 
number prices. In each year, we calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and 
“4.” The submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total 
number of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “4” and “0” are calculated in a similar fashion. Mark-to-market 
intraday return is expressed in percentage, and is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. All 
items are first calculated for each investor-year observation and then averaged for each quintile with equal weights. To ensure a reasonable 
magnitude of superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-
value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
 
Quintile Ranks of  Quintile Ranks of 𝑆𝐼𝑡−1     
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0,𝑡−1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
Q1 -0.057  -0.058  -0.059  -0.074  -0.088  -0.032***   0.000 
Q2 -0.077  -0.069  -0.070  -0.075  -0.092  -0.014***   0.003 
Q3 -0.082  -0.074  -0.090  -0.079  -0.098  -0.015***   0.004 
Q4 -0.092  -0.100  -0.095  -0.096  -0.103  -0.012*   0.051 
Q5 -0.102  -0.109  -0.110  -0.106  -0.102   -0.000   0.990 
        Diff (Q5-Q1) -0.045*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.032*** -0.014* 








Table AVII. Individual Investors’ Superstition Index and Investment Performance – Two-Stage Regression 
 
In this table, we report the parameter estimates of a two-stage panel regression for individual investors. In the first stage, we perform the following 
regression for each of the eight return measures separately: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽4 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
We take 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 , the residual superstition index, from the first stage regression and perform the following regression in the second stage: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i in year t and year t-1. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
investor i’s superstition index in year t-1, which is calculated as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” The 
submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of 
limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average 
number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices 
ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. 
Mark-to-market return of limit (market) orders is the return under the assumption that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the closing 
price of a trading day. The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by 
the average round-trip duration for each investor. Results for the first and second stage regressions are separately reported in Panel A and Panel B. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the superstition index, we require that investors submit at 







Panel A (First Stage Regression): Regressing Superstition Index on Other Aspects of Investor Trading Skills 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.010*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.158) (0.748) (0.709) (0.144) (0.031) (0.026) 
Constant 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 57,217 57,215 57,189 33,585 33,545 32,942 57,263 57,263 
Adjusted R
2







Panel B (Second Stage Regression): Regressing Investment Performance on Residual Superstition Index  
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.068*** -0.103*** -0.269*** -0.046 -0.176** -0.206 -15,849.138 -1.270 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.232) (0.026) (0.195) (0.145) (0.147) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -1,650.379 -0.114 
 
(0.007) (0.565) (0.518) (0.124) (0.331) (0.774) (0.187) (0.241) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.038*** -0.077*** -0.162*** -0.047*** -0.107*** -0.133*** 37,803.789 3.085 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.328) (0.325) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007* 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.011 3,592.455 0.293 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.270) (0.295) (0.288) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.040** 16,403.018 1.335 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.268) (0.267) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.071*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.011 0.002 0.013 0.632*** 0.640*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.254) (0.864) (0.205) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.049*** -0.084*** -0.046* -0.048*** -0.058* -0.066 -3,393.385 -0.327 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.001) (0.059) (0.287) (0.461) (0.358) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 56,968 56,963 56,824 25,723 25,673 24,962 56,830 56,830 
Adjusted R
2







Table AVIII. A Placebo Test: Pseudo Superstition Index and Investment Performance of Individual Investors– Regression Analysis 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i in year t and year t-1. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
investor i’s pseudo superstition index in year t-1, calculated as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “7” and “3.” In each year, we 
calculate the investor’s submission ratio at “7” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “7” divided by the total number of 
limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “3” is calculated in a similar fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average 
number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices 
ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. 
Mark-to-market return of limit (market) orders is the return under the assumption that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the closing 
price of a trading day. The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by 
the average round-trip duration for each investor. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the 
superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance 








Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.015 0.034 0.176 -0.060 0.113 0.067 4,739.201 0.237 
 
(0.580) (0.542) (0.130) (0.397) (0.413) (0.819) (0.258) (0.478) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** -0.001 -0.004** 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -1,029.776 -0.055 
 
(0.000) (0.521) (0.039) (0.174) (0.149) (0.591) (0.123) (0.231) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.039*** -0.083*** -0.163*** -0.044*** -0.118*** -0.204*** -752.143 -0.066 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.433) (0.358) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 0.025** 966.223** 0.078*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.016) (0.008) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.019*** -0.048*** -0.139*** -0.019*** -0.058*** -0.145*** -4,654.303*** -0.384*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.091*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.019* 0.007 0.008 0.550*** 0.540*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.092) (0.527) (0.483) (0.002) (0.004) 
Constant -0.061*** -0.097*** -0.045 -0.047*** -0.073** -0.074 -638.298 -0.103 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.105) (0.004) (0.036) (0.286) (0.774) (0.485) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 46,741 46,737 46,648 21,323 21,280 20,685 46,815 46,815 
Adjusted R
2










Table AIX. Individual Investors’ Superstition Index and Investment Performance – Lucky vs. Unlucky Side 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i in year t and year t-1. 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
the lucky or unlucky part of investor i’s superstition index in year t-1. In Panel A, we consider the lucky part of superstition index by calculating 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “3” for investor i in year t-1. In Panel B, we consider the unlucky part of 
superstition index by calculating 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “3” and “4” for investor i in year t-1. The 
submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of 
limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratios at “3” and“4” are calculated in a similar fashion. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
average number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at 
prices ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. 
Mark-to-market return of limit (market) orders is the return under the assumption that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the closing 
price of a trading day. The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by 
the average round-trip duration for each investor. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the 
superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance 







Panel A: Lucky Part of the Superstition Index 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜8,𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜3,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.063*** -0.061* -0.180** -0.040 -0.092 -0.272 -39,311.340 -3.264 
 
(0.000) (0.075) (0.011) (0.356) (0.293) (0.139) (0.306) (0.293) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -1,643.621 -0.114 
 
(0.000) (0.539) (0.557) (0.249) (0.445) (0.555) (0.205) (0.258) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.046*** -0.083*** -0.172*** -0.049*** -0.127*** -0.178*** 48,620.242 3.956 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.326) (0.324) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.017 2,999.263 0.246 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.286) (0.276) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.023*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.042*** -0.038** 18,960.959 1.539 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) (0.268) (0.268) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.082*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.015 0.002 0.011 0.660*** 0.667*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.146) (0.883) (0.308) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.052*** -0.091*** -0.054* -0.047*** -0.053 -0.070 -1,638.501 -0.186 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.002) (0.105) (0.294) (0.580) (0.385) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 51,836 51,832 51,709 23,349 23,303 22,646 51,756 51,756 
Adjusted R
2







Panel B: Unlucky Part of the Superstition Index 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜3,𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜4,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.013 -0.084* -0.248** -0.024 -0.033 -0.034 -5,608.824 -0.374 
 
(0.562) (0.075) (0.014) (0.684) (0.802) (0.900) (0.136) (0.151) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.002*** -0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -883.853 -0.046 
 
(0.000) (0.792) (0.107) (0.128) (0.166) (0.709) (0.183) (0.314) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.040*** -0.078*** -0.160*** -0.047*** -0.119*** -0.150*** -528.127 -0.054 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.559) (0.410) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.018* 831.421** 0.068** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.078) (0.023) (0.011) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.020*** -0.047*** -0.136*** -0.018*** -0.054*** -0.147*** -4,539.066*** -0.375*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.081*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.017* 0.005 0.010 0.531*** 0.522*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.083) (0.673) (0.364) (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant -0.056*** -0.088*** -0.048* -0.043*** -0.057* -0.065 -212.111 -0.062 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.073) (0.005) (0.087) (0.330) (0.918) (0.652) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 50,763 50,759 50,657 23,177 23,132 22,489 50,843 50,843 
Adjusted R
2







Table AX. Individual Investors’ Pseudo-Superstition Index, Market Return, and the Buy Ratio and Buy-sell Ratio – Quintile Analysis 
 
In this table we report the Buy Ratio and Buy-sell Ratio for individual investors with various pseudo-superstition indices and under different 
market returns. We first sort individual investors into quintiles by the pseudo superstition index in one year. Investors in quintile 5 (Q5) of the 
pseudo-superstitious index are the most pseudo superstitious. We then sort the trading days of the next year into quintiles based on the daily 
market returns. Market returns on trading days in Quintile-5 (M5) are the highest. We then compute the average Buy Ratio and average Buy-Sell 
Ratio of each product (MXF or TXF orders that expire in one month, two months, three months, six months, nine months, or one year) for the 
investors in each pseudo superstitious quintile and market return quintile. We define 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 as the difference between limit order submission ratios 
at “7” and “3” for investor i in year t-1. We calculate the investor’s submission ratio at “7” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending 
with “7” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “3” is calculated in a similar 
fashion. The Buy Ratio is calculated as the number of buy contracts (taking long positions) scaled by total number of executed contracts. We 
calculate the Buy-sell Ratio as the difference between the numbers of buy and sell contracts, divided by their average. Both limit and market 
orders are included in the calculation of Buy Ratio and Buy-sell Ratio. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable 
magnitude of the superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. The Satterthwaite p-
value assumes unequal variances of investor performance in quintiles 1 and 5. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Buy Ratio 
Quintile Ranks of Quintile Ranks of Pseudo 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1     
Market Returns Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
M1 0.705  0.679  0.673  0.668  0.698  -0.007 0.369 
M2 0.628  0.613  0.616  0.608  0.626   -0.002   0.261 
M3 0.587  0.578  0.579  0.573  0.579  -0.008 0.352 
M4 0.552  0.553  0.553  0.548  0.546  -0.007 0.256 
M5 0.529  0.537  0.544  0.535  0.526   -0.003 0.165 
        Diff (M5-M1) -0.176*** -0.142*** -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.172*** 







Panel B: Buy-Sell Ratio 
Quintile Ranks of Quintile Ranks of Pseudo 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1     
Market Returns Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff (Q5-Q1) p-value 
M1 0.820  0.717  0.691  0.670  0.792  -0.028 0.103 
M2 0.513  0.452  0.463  0.430  0.504   -0.009   0.261 
M3 0.347  0.312  0.318  0.292  0.315  -0.033 0.105 
M4 0.209  0.212  0.214  0.193  0.182  -0.027 0.101 
M5 0.117  0.149  0.176  0.138  0.106   -0.012   0.165 
        Diff (M5-M1) -0.702*** -0.568*** -0.515*** -0.532*** -0.686*** 







o-Table AXI. Individual Investors’ Time-to-Execution/Time-to-Cancellation and Investment Performance 
In this table we report the parameter estimates for the following panel regression: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡(𝑜𝑟  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  are the average mark-to-market returns or round-trip performance for investor i in year t and year t-1. 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the interval from order submission to execution for executed limit orders for investor i in year t. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
is the interval from submission to cancellation for orders that are submitted and then deleted by investor i in year t. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average 
number of contracts per limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission ratios at prices 
ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1)  is the log of number of limit orders submitted by investor i in the previous year. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in year t-1, divided by their average. 
Mark-to-market return of limit (market) orders is the return under the assumption that the initiating limit (market) orders are covered at the closing 
price of a trading day. The round-trip daily profit and daily index return are calculated as the average round-trip profit or index return divided by 
the average round-trip duration for each investor. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. To ensure a reasonable magnitude of the 
superstition index, we require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of two consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance 







Panel A. Time-to-Execution 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 -0.029*** -0.038*** -0.043*** -0.019*** -0.021** -0.006 -17,251.539 -1.390 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.716) (0.307) (0.310) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001** 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -1,711.001 -0.119 
 
(0.011) (0.665) (0.477) (0.125) (0.338) (0.790) (0.190) (0.244) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.020*** -0.052*** -0.134*** -0.033*** -0.092*** -0.125** 48,778.242 3.970 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.018) (0.324) (0.322) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007* 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.010 3,507.781 0.286 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.001) (0.286) (0.296) (0.289) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,−1 -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.018** -0.021*** -0.038*** -0.040** 18,288.088 1.487 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.272) (0.272) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.064*** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.636*** 0.644*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.258) (0.860) (0.210) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.045*** -0.078*** -0.039 -0.044*** -0.053* -0.065 -124.241 -0.064 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.002) (0.082) (0.293) (0.957) (0.686) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 56,952 56,947 56,808 25,735 25,685 24,974 56,843 56,843 
Adjusted R
2







Panel B. Time-to-Cancellation 
Independent 
Mark-to-market Return of Limit 
Orders (%) 
Mark-to-market Return of Market 
Orders (%) Round-trip Performance 
Variable Intraday 1-day 5-day Intraday 1-day 5-day 
Daily profit 
(TWD) 
Daily index return 
(%) 
  
        𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.013*** -0.024*** 38.063 0.006 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.847) (0.706) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 0.001** 0.000 -0.001 0.002* 0.002 -0.001 -772.719 -0.039 
 
(0.017) (0.718) (0.523) (0.079) (0.304) (0.837) (0.287) (0.445) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.032*** -0.066*** -0.148*** -0.037*** -0.082*** -0.079 -1,430.179 -0.095 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.139) (0.168) (0.203) 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.004 161.475 0.016 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.358) (0.000) (0.007) (0.644) (0.683) (0.611) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.034*** -0.030* 1,363.819* 0.118* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.068) (0.078) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.066*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.562*** 0.575*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.315) (0.957) (0.373) (0.001) (0.003) 
Constant -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.019 -0.031** -0.028 -0.022 1,322.681 0.041 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.485) (0.033) (0.371) (0.733) (0.526) (0.771) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of obs. 55,372 55,367 55,234 25,271 25,223 24,521 55,312 55,312 
Adjusted R
2






Appendix Table AXII. Investors’ Learning and Superstition 
 
In this table we report the parameter estimates from the following regression for individual investors: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−𝑘)  + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 are the superstition indices for investor i in years t and t-1, and are calculated as the 
difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4” in each year. We calculate the investor’s 
submission ratio at “8” as the number of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the 
total number of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated 
in a similar fashion. 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑖,𝑡−𝑘) is the log of the number of limit orders submitted by investor i in year t-k 
(k is an integer that ranges from 1 to 3). 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛8,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit 
orders submitted by investor i at prices ending with “8” in year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market 
intraday return of limit orders submitted by investor i at prices ending with “4” in year t-1. 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the mark-to-market intraday return of limit orders submitted by investor i at prices 
ending with other numbers in year t-1. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1  is the mark-to-market intraday return of 
market orders submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the average number of contracts per 
limit order submitted by investor i in year t-1. 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 is the sum of investor i’s submission 
ratios at prices ending with “0” and “5” in year t-1. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 is the disposition effect, which is 
calculated as the difference between the durations of losing and winning round-trip trades of investor i in 
year t-1, divided by their average. We express the superstition index in percentage. In models 1 and 4, we 
require that investors submit at least 10 limit orders in each of the two consecutive years. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. In models 2 and 5, we require that investors must submit at least 10 
limit orders in each of three consecutive years. In models 3 and 6, we require that investors submit at least 
10 limit orders in each of four consecutive years. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 0.1, 0.05, 







Independent  𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 (%)   
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 




























   
-0.103 -0.111 -0.133 
    
(0.343) (0.306) (0.478) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛4,𝑖,𝑡−1 (%) 
   
-0.052 -0.055 -0.002 
    
(0.602) (0.577) (0.989) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟,𝑖,𝑡−1 (%) 
   
-0.767** -0.858*** -0.692 
    
(0.018) (0.008) (0.185) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡,𝑖,𝑡−1 (%) 
   
0.032 0.020 0.075 
    
(0.772) (0.856) (0.683) 
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 (%) -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.391*** -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.270*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.035** -0.013 -0.019 -0.023 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.293) (0.125) (0.173) 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5,𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.932*** -0.884*** -1.512*** -0.017 0.044 -0.832** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.940) (0.844) (0.011) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 0.279*** 0.276*** 0.340*** 0.207*** 0.196*** 0.204* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.060) 
Constant 2.785*** 2.634*** 2.392*** 2.274*** 1.677*** 2.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56,260 56,260 24,388 22,298 22,298 9,404 





Figure A1. Limit Order Submission Ratios on Various Days of the Month 
 
In this figure, we report the proportion of limit orders submitted by investors on various dates in the month. The submission ratio is calculated as 
the number of limit orders submitted on each date of the month divided by the total number of limit orders submitted in the month. We report the 
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Figure A2. Limit Order Submission Ratios at Various Prices for Limit Buy Orders 
 
In this figure, we report the proportion of limit buy orders submitted by investors at prices ending with “X” 
(X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). The submission ratio is calculated as the number of limit buy orders 
submitted at "X" divided by the total number of submitted limit buy orders. We report the figures 
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Figure A2.A. Individual Investors 

































































Last One Digit 
Figure A2.B. Domestic Institutional Investors 
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Figure A3. Limit Order Submission Ratios at Various Prices for Limit Sell Orders 
 
In this figure, we report the proportion of limit sell orders submitted by investors at prices ending with “X” 
(X is an integer ranging from 0 to 9). The submission ratio is calculated as the number of limit sell orders 
submitted at "X" divided by the total number of submitted limit sell orders. We report the figures 
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Figure A3.A. Individual Investors 
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Figure A3.B. Domestic Institutional Investors 
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Figure A4. Superstition and Intraday Returns of Limit Orders Submitted at “X” 
 
In this figure, we sort investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, and plot the mark-to-
market return of limit orders submitted at prices ending with “X” in the subsequent year (X is an integer 
ranging from 0 to 9). Quintile-5 (Q5) investors are more superstitious. In each year, we calculate the 
superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at “8” and “4.” 
The submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders submitted at prices 
ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices within a year. The 
submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. Mark-to-market intraday return is the difference 
between the trade price and the daily closing price divided by the trade price. Results for individual 
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Figure A5. Intraday Returns of Institutional Investors When They Pick Up Limit Orders Submitted 
by Individual Investors at “X”  
 
In this figure, we plot the returns of institutional investors when they pick up the limit orders submitted by 
individual investors. We first sort individual investors into quintiles by the superstition index in one year, 
and group their limit orders in the subsequent year into ten groups according to the last digit of limit order 
prices. The Quintile-5 individual investors are the most superstitious. We then identify the individual limit 
orders that are picked up by institutional investors. The intraday mark-to-market returns of institutional 
investors are calculated separately for those orders that have picked up the limit orders submitted by the 
Quintile-5 and Quintile-1 individual investors, and for each of the last one digit. In each year, we 
calculate the superstition index for each investor as the difference between limit order submission ratios at 
“8” and “4.” The submission ratio at “8” of an investor is calculated as the number of limit orders 
submitted at prices ending with “8” divided by the total number of limit orders submitted at all prices 
within a year. The submission ratio at “4” is calculated in a similar fashion. Mark-to-market intraday 
return of institutional investors is the difference between the trade price and the daily closing price 
divided by the trade price. Results for domestic institutions and Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
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Figure A5.B. Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
Quintile 1
Quintile 5
